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A thorough analysis of a defined contribution (DC) plan, or a plan with a large emphasis 
on DC, has not yet been performed for military retirement. This thesis undertakes this task. 
It assumes that each Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) proposal was implemented 
for the cohorts entering the Navy from 1985 to 1992 and calculates the value of these 
defined benefit (DB)–focused retirement proposals. It then assumes that a DC plan was 
implemented and received equal funding as each DB plan for the same cohorts. It then 
compares the value of the DB proposals with the DC proposals and discusses how a DC 
plan fulfills the goals of reform.  
In this thesis, an enlisted Sailor’s expected net present value (ENPV) was 150% 
higher with a DC plan than with the OSD options funded at the same level; an officer’s 
ENPV was 115% higher. When considering only the retirees with 20 years of service 
(YOS), a DC plan generated a net present value 18% higher for enlisted and 13% higher 
for officers. The DC plan provided a more generous retirement benefit to those who 
separated before 20 YOS and a slightly better retirement benefit to those who retired after 
20 YOS. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Under pressure to reduce the growth of military spending, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has looked at ways to reduce expenditures throughout all budget items, 
including military retirement. The current system requests a large sum of money each year 
and sets it aside to fund the defined benefits for retirees 20 years from now. Most proposals 
follow the same pattern but attempt to significantly reduce costs without severely reducing 
the retirement benefit to future officers and enlisted communities. The Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) has tried to separate from this type of accrual accounting by 
proposing a hybrid system that decreases the defined benefit (DB) portion and offsets this 
with two cash payments and a modest defined contribution (DC). 
However, none of the proposals have thoroughly examined the effects of the 
military retirement plan, which is completely DC. The opportunities and risks associated 
with a DC plan are distinctly different than those offered by the military’s DB plans. To 
date, there has not been a serious analysis of the value associated with a DC retirement plan 
or a comparison with the most recent proposals. 
In this thesis, it is assumed that each OSD proposal was implemented for the cohorts 
entering the Navy from 1985 to 1992 and calculates the value of these DB-focused 
retirement proposals. It then assumes that a DC plan was implemented and was funded at 
the same level as each DB plan for the same cohorts. It then compares the value of the DB 
proposals with the DC proposals and discusses how it fulfills the goals of reform. 
These findings are intended to inform and support decisions regarding military 
retirement reform. They are also intended to expand the current discussion and encourage 
additional research into this area that could potentially lead to a leaner retirement system 
that is still perceived as fair, while allowing the needed flexibility for force shaping. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Military retirement is a great deal for 13.5% of military members who qualify to 
receive retirement benefits. After 20 years working in the military, a service member can 
retire and receive about 50% of their pay for the rest of their life. This fact is one of the 
 2 
most popular benefits that people cite when they talk about the benefits of military service. 
However, the cost of retirement benefits is growing primarily because the basic pay of 
military members has grown at a rate that exceeds the growth of inflation, and the DoD is 
under pressure to reduce the defense portion of its budget. The most recent proposals under 
consideration for reforming the military retirement system consider replacing an entirely 
DB program with a mostly DB program. This move is estimated to save the DoD 10% to 
20% of the cost of retirement (Grefer, Phillips, & Shuford, 2012). The DoD has not yet 
considered the alternative of an entirely DC program that could meet the objectives of 
retirement reform. 
In this chapter, I describe the main features of the current military retirement system 
and identifies how retirement benefits are calculated and dispersed to the retiree. It then 
presents how the DoD currently funds the retirement system and examines its short-
comings. The chapter then discusses the main features of DC plans, employees’ preference 
for DC plans, and the call to reform the current system. 
B. RETIREE BENEFITS 
The belief that military retirement is to receive 50% of your pay for the rest of your 
life is mostly accurate but requires a little more information to capture the final value. First 
of all, military retirement is a DB plan, which vests after 20 years of service and pays a 
lifetime annuity that begins at retirement and is commensurate to your pay upon retirement. 
These primary points of the retirement system are discussed in detail as follows. 
A DB program means that the employee will receive a specific benefit upon 
retirement. The employer bears the responsibility to select an investment, provide 
contributions, and manage risks sufficiently to ensure that the benefit is available upon 
retirement. The employee’s primary interest is the size of the benefit upon retirement. 
Vesting in a retirement plan means that you own it (Internal Revenue Service, 
2013). Civilian DB plans are required to vest using a seven-year graduated vesting or a 
five-year cliff vesting, as shown in Table 1. Retirement benefits for military retirees cliff 
vests at 20 years of service (YOS). This means that at 19 YOS, you own 0% of your 
retirement, and at 20 YOS, you own 100% of your retirement. 
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Effective Date 1/01/89 - Present- for Defined Benefit Employer Contributions 
Effective Date 1/01/89 - 2007 - for Other Defined Contribution Employer Contributions 
Effective Date 1/01/89 - 2002 - 401(k) Matching Employer Contributions 
Graduated Vesting 







Less than 5 years of service - 0% Vested 
At least 5 years of service - 100% Vested 
Table 1.   Vestiture Laws for Defined Benefit Retirement Plans (From U.S. 
Department of Labor, n.d.) 
Not only does the retirement benefit vest at 20 years, but payout—when service 
members can begin to collect retirement benefits—begins upon retirement, which is as 
early as 20 YOS. These benefits have several features. First, this plan is an annuity that is 
paid monthly. Second, the amount of the annuity has cost of living adjustments (COLAs) 
that are designed to compensate for inflation by raising the amount of the annuity by the 
same percentage of inflation; COLAs occur each year (Under Secretary of Defense, 
Personnel & Readiness, n.d.). Third, the annuity is paid for the rest of the life of the retiree. 
And finally, at the death of the retiree, eligible survivors can continue to receive 55% of 
the inflation-adjusted annuity, unless the retiree elected not to pay the premium for survivor 
benefits. 
The last, primary point of these retirement benefits is the amount or size of the 
annuity. Current military retirement is purely a function of pay and time in service. It is 
calculated by multiplying 2.5%, the YOS, and the average of the last three years of pay, 
which is commonly called “High Three” (Hi-3). Equation 1 shows the calculation for the 




𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 2.5% ∗ 20 ∗





Twenty multiplied by 2.5% is 50%; this number demonstrates how service 
members can retire after 20 years and receive half of their pay for life. For an officer who 
retired as an O5 in 2012, the retirement pay would equal approximately $45,784. Projecting 
a 5.75% return on investment and retirement pay for 35 years (Grefer et al., 2012), the net 
present value (NPV) of that annuity is about $690,000. For the enlisted Sailor who retired 
as an E7, the annuity would be $21,900 per year with the NPV of a 38-year annuity equal 
to $337,800 (Grefer et al., 2012). 
C. GOVERNMENT OBLIGATION AND INVESTMENT 
In 1984, Congress required the DoD to use accrual accounting to fund military 
retirement (Eisenman, Frissmer, Hosek, & Taylor, 2001). The DoD does this by investing 
a lump sum of money each year and allowing it to grow for 20 years. After 20 years, the 
money is used to fund retirement benefits for the retirees who joined the military in the 
year that the lump sum was invested. For example, consider that the retired O5 from the 
previous section joined the military in 1992. That year, there was an average of 550,847 
officers and enlisted Sailors in the Navy (DoN, Military Personnel Navy, 1992, p. 7), of 
which 47,924 were newly enlisted and 5,087 were newly commissioned (Defense 
Manpower Data Center, 2013). The Navy calculated the contribution as the product of 
“Normal cost percentage of … 42.72% in FY92” and “The total amount of basic pay 
expected to be paid during the fiscal year to members of the armed forces” (DoN, Military 
Personnel Navy, 1992, p. 24). 
Basic pay required for all Sailors was $9.78 billion, and the retirement request was 
$4.17 billion. The retirement funds then are invested in Treasury Inflation-Protected 
Securities (TIPS), an investment with minimal risk that provides the modest rate of return 
of approximately 1% above inflation. In 2012, these funds began to provide retirement 
benefits for the members of this cohort who retired. However, the average retirement rate 
for officers is 18% and for enlisted, 13%. In summary, $4.17 billion (41.2% of base pay in 
1992) was set aside in 1992 to fund the retirement for an estimated 937 officers and 6,230 
enlisted Sailors, which represents 1.3% of the total force in 1992. 
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D. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
When the current retirement system is examined with such scrutiny, several 
shortcomings become apparent. The largest shortcoming from the retiree’s perspective is 
the aspect of transferability to survivors. The two-part problem that the DoD faces is the 
growth of base pay and the return on the investment. Finally, the problem facing all other 
service members is that they will leave service before they vest and therefore receive no 
retirement benefits. The primary focus of retirement reform is to find solutions to the most 
pressing of these problems. 
1. For the Retiree 
In light of other problems with the retirement system, increasing survivor benefits 
receives very little attention. However, it is worth noting because the need exists and other 
retirement systems address this more effectively. Take for example the retired officer 
whose life comes to an untimely end shortly after retirement. If this officer was married 
and had children attending or entering college, the difference between retirement pay and 
survivor benefits could place college attendance in jeopardy. However, 401(k) retirement 
plans are fully transferrable to survivors and could provide financial support required by 
the family. If the retiree truly owns the benefits, then cutting the benefits by 45% acts as 
an estate tax on his retirement benefits paid by his dependents. 
2. For the Department of Defense 
Extending full retirement benefits to survivors places greater strain on a system 
already struggling to meet its liabilities. The DoD faces many challenges in its attempts to 
manage the spiraling costs of retirement. The first challenge is that pay increases have 
varied widely over the years and, in some years, have happened twice in a year. This means 
that budget-makers in 1992 needed to estimate how much pay would increase over the 
course of a 20-year career, calculate the expected future liability, then calculate the amount 
of money to request in 1992 that would grow to meet the liability by 2012. This brings us 
to the second challenge: the contribution has a poor rate of return. While TIPS provide 
security during times of economic decline, they fail to provide adequate returns in times of 
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plenty. This low rate of return necessitates a very large investment to meet the future 
liability of the retirement benefits. The DoD needs to reduce the size of this investment. 
3. For Other Military Members 
The retirement system is inconsistent with the laws that govern DB plans for the 
rest of the population. In addition, it helps only a few of the people who serve in the 
military, which is the problem that all other service members face. Consider the cohort 
from 1992. The Department of the Navy (DoN) requested $4.17 billion intended to benefit 
only 13.5% of the cohort, or 1.3% of the force. The other 40% of the cohort who honorably 
served receive no benefit (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2013). This practice fails to 
recognize and reward the honorable service and sacrifices made by service members and 
their families who serve fewer than 20 years. The biggest risk to military members, under 
the current retirement system, is whether one will receive any retirement benefit. 
Approximately 86.5% of military members will not receive retirement benefits. 
E. DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
A DC retirement plan, on the other hand, is widely used in the civilian workplace 
and offers many benefits that the current military retirement plan does not provide. DC 
plans differ primarily from DB plans because the employer is responsible to contribute to 
an employee’s retirement plan and provide plan options from which the employee can 
choose to invest. The employer has fiduciary responsibility over their DC plans. In other 
words, the employer can select plans that are in the interest of the plan participants with 
the “exclusive purpose of providing benefits to them” (U.S. Department of Labor, n.d.). 
Selecting the choice of plans also allows the employer a degree of control over how much 
risk the employee will bear. 
DC allows employees a degree of freedom, permitting them to take higher or lower 
risk in an effort to increase returns, security, or diversity. An important benefit of a DC 
plan is the ability for an employee to transfer their retirement account when they switch 
employers. When an employer contributes to an employee’s plan and allows the employee 
to manage their retirement investment, it relieves the employer of the responsibility to 
provide future benefits and eliminates the future liability associated with a DB plan. In 
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effect, the employer transfers to the employee the responsibility to invest and manage risk 
to ensure that a benefit exists in the future. Despite this increased risk and responsibility, 
employees have shown a preference for DC plans over DB plans. 
In a comparative examination of DC versus DB retirement plans in the private 
sector, Childs, Fore, Ott, and Lilly (2012) examined the preference for a DB or DC plan 
from the point of view of the employer and the employee. The analysis of Childs et al. 
(2012) suggested that when employees were younger or could easily switch employers, 
employees and employers preferred DC plans. Employees saw DC contributions as a form 
of compensation. Employees also valued a DC plan because of its transferability. 
Employers valued DC plans because they shifted the risk of investment to the employee. 
In addition, employers who offered DC plans were able to hire at lower salaries than 
employers who only offered DB plans. Childs et al. also found that the cost of the higher 
wages dominated any cost savings that DB plans generated through employee retention.  
There are several reasons that may explain these results. First, the initial 
investments of younger individuals can take on more risk. Should taking a greater risk lead 
to a loss of investment, there is more time to recover from that loss. Second, individuals 
who are more likely to move will value portability. Third, job turnover is higher for 
younger employees and employees with less seniority than it is with older, more 
experienced employees. Finally, employees see DC as a type of compensation, which is 
interchangeable with salary compensation. The suggestions from Childs et al. (2012), if 
accurate, may have particular application to the Navy. The employee demographics within 
the Navy fit within the demographic that prefers DC plans: Approximately 50% of the 
force is younger than 25 years old and will switch employment after six years. The Navy 
is interested in reducing costs: A DC plan would shift the risk of investment to employees 
and may lead to reduced salaries. 
F. DISCOUNT RATE 
The discount rate is used in financial equations and attempts to quantify the value 
that an individual places on having money now rather than later. Put very simply, if one is 
offered $100 next year but has the chance to accept less than $100 now in lieu of payment 
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next year, the discount rate is the difference between the $100 and today’s amount divided 
by today’s amount. For example, if one will accept no less than $90 today in lieu of $100 
next year, the discount rate is calculated by Equation 2, which Calculates the discount rate 
where $100 represents the payment promised in one year and $90 represents the discounted 
payment accepted at the present time in lieu of future payment (After Brealy, Myers, & 
Allen, 2011). 
 
Discount Rate (%) = ($100-$90)/$90 = 11.1% (2) 
 
Therefore, one is willing to take 11.1% less money now in lieu of more money in 
the future. In Childs et al. (2012), a portion of the lower wage that employees would accept 
from an employer that offered a DC plan represented how the employee valued the 
transferability of the account. This value could be considered a contributor to a discount 
rate for a DB retirement plan. In other words, employees will accept lower pay now if given 
greater control and transferability of the retirement account now. Many of the contributors 
that influence an individual’s preference, or discount rate, for a DC retirement plan are not 
found in the military’s current pension system. Military members might value full 
transferability to survivors, investment flexibility, payout flexibility, earlier vesting, and 
the ability to convert military retirement to a second employer’s plan. 
G. CALL FOR REFORM  
The problems faced by the DoD and the service members who receive no retirement 
benefit motivate the call for reform. Until recently, military retirement reform ignored 
plans that included DC, relying heavily upon different methods or values of a DB plan. 
Recently, the OSD proposed modifying the current DB system to a hybrid system 
composed of DC, DB, and two cash bonuses. The components of these hybrid proposals 
attempt to address the concerns of affordability for the DoD and provide benefits for 
military members who serve fewer than 20 years. It should be noted, however, that the DC 
portion is the only benefit that vests within the first decade of service and is much less 
valuable than the DB component of these proposals.  
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This thesis aims to address how a DC retirement system compares to the OSD 
proposals. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II reviews the most current 
and relevant studies regarding military retirement reform. Chapter III establishes the 
methodology used to calculate the values of the retirement systems. Chapter IV discusses 
the results and findings. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the research and recommends 
future areas of research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the most recent literature related to the topic of this thesis. 
First is the OSD’s five options for retirement reform. Second is the Center for Naval 
Analyses (CNA) examination of the effects that these proposals will have on the DoN. 
Third is a Naval Postgraduate School thesis that calculates the probable benefit a Sailor or 
Marine may expect from these proposals. Finally, a Defense Business Board (DBB) brief 
recommends moving to a defined contribution system. 
A. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
The OSD had three primary objectives that helped to shape their proposals: first, 
reduce costs to the DoD; second, have a minimal impact on the current shape of the force; 
and third, provide some benefit to those who serve fewer than 20 years. The OSD proposed 
a hybrid benefit that includes two DBs (a second-career benefit and a retirement benefit), 
a DC, a continuation bonus, and a transition bonus. Each benefit is intended to reduce the 
cost to the DoD. A tiered DB reduces future liability and the current dollars required to 
fund it. Career bonuses and transition bonuses are intended to maintain the current force 
structure by offsetting the reduced future benefit to the retiree by providing a present value. 
Finally, DCs provide some benefit to those who serve fewer than 20 years.  
The OSD created two categories for retirement, one for officers and the other for 
enlisted. Each category has five different options of the hybrid system. The hybrid system 
is composed of the following five components: a second-career DB, a retirement benefit, a 
DC benefit, a continuation bonus, and a transition payment. The difference between the 
enlisted category and the officer category is the amount of the continuation bonus and the 
milestone when it is paid.  
The second-career DB and the retirement DB are classified as DB1 and DB2, 
respectively. DB1 acknowledges the likelihood that retirees will seek a second career as a 
primary source of income; therefore, DB1 would be a supplement to that income. DB1 
vests at 20 years and pays benefits until the age of 60. DB2 is considered a full retirement 
that also vests at 20 years and pays benefits from the age of 60 for life. The DC is a 401(k)-
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type benefit that the DoD contributes without requiring additional service member 
contributions. The DC payments start at YOS 3 and vest at YOS 6. The DoD’s DC plan is 
called the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). The continuation bonus (CB) is designed to help 
maintain forces at their current strength, receivable at 12 years of service for enlisted and 
16 years of service for officers. The transition payment (TP) is receivable at separation 
after 20 YOS. In addition to the tiers, there are five options for each tier that are 
differentiated from each other by the multipliers used to calculate the various benefits. 
Table 2 shows the options for enlisted retirement, and Table 3 shows the options for officer 
retirement. 
 
 Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 
DB
 




0.025*YOS*Hi-3 0.02*YOS*Hi-3 0.02*YOS*Hi-3 0.015*YOS*Hi-3 0.0175*YOS*Hi-
3 
DC 0.05*BP 0.05*BP 0.05*BP 0.05*BP 0.05*BP 
CB 2.49*(1-mo BP) 2.57*(1-mo BP) 2.57*(1-mo BP) 6.65*(1-mo BP) 4.63*(1-mo BP) 
TP 2.5*(1-yr BP) 3.0*(1-yr BP) 0.5*(1-yr BP) 1.0*(1-yr BP) 0.75*(1-yr BP) 
Table 2.   Calculations for OSD Options for Enlisted Retirement  
(From Grefer et al., 2012) 
 Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 












DC 0.05*BP 0.05*BP 0.05*BP 0.05*BP 0.05*BP 
CB 5.78*(1-mo BP) 11.33*(1-mo 
BP) 
8.69*(1-mo BP) 23.53*(1-mo BP) 16.13*(1-mo BP) 
TP 2.5*(1-yr BP) 3.0*(1-yr BP) 0.5*(1-yr BP) 1.0*(1-yr BP) 0.75*(1-yr BP) 
Table 3.   Calculations for OSD Options for Officer Retirement  
(From Grefer et al., 2012) 
When analyzing the multipliers, it is clear that Option A maintains DB2 at the 
current retirement rate and places higher emphasis on TP. Option B places higher emphasis 
on CB and TP at the expense of DB1 and DB2. Option C places moderate emphasis on CB 
and makes DB1 and DB2 the same amount. Option D is similar to Option C except that 
CB receives the highest emphasis of all options. Finally, Option D.1 provides a middle 
ground between Option C and Option D. Under all five options, only 15% of the retirement 
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benefit is from DC, with the majority of retirement benefits (60% to 82%) vesting at 20 
years. 
B. CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES 
As part of a larger analysis in 2012 regarding military retirement reform and its 
effects on the Navy, Grefer et al. (2012) modeled the OSD’s proposals to determine the 
effects on the Navy’s personnel profiles and any cost savings these proposals might 
generate. Grefer et al.  concluded that retirement reform would provide a retirement cost 
savings to the Navy but at the expense of creating a more junior force. Grefer et al.  
determined the retirement cost savings by comparing the costs of the proposals to the 
current retirement contribution costs, 33.4% of base pay for all personnel.  
Grefer et al.  first calculated the NPV to the retiree of each component of the five 
options, then added the five components together to determine the total NPV of each 
option. Next, it calculated the annual contributions required to meet the calculated NPV. 
Grefer et al.  determined that Option A, when fully implemented, would reduce retirement 
costs by 15.5%, Option B by 20.1%, Option C by 17.1%, Option D by 10.5 %, and Option 
D.1 by 13.4% (see Table 4).  
 






Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 
Total Costs of 
Current System $3,735.00 $3,735.00 $3,735.00 $3,735.00 $3,735.00 
Total Cost of 






$578.00 $750.00 $637.00 $391.00 $502.00 
% Savings 15.5% 20.1% 17.1% 10.5% 13.4% 
New Retirement 
Contributions 28.23% 26.69% 27.70% 29.90% 28.91% 
Table 4.   DoN Cost Savings by Implementing Retirement Options  
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(After Grefer et al., 2012) 
In addition to retirement cost savings, Grefer et al. identified a reduction in cost as 
a result of lower reenlistment rates and fewer people eligible for retirement benefits. Fewer 
retirees reduces future liability, and lower reenlistment rates requires the Navy to recruit 
more people so that mid-level jobs can be filled. On the whole, the effect on manning is 
that some senior personnel, with higher salaries, are replaced by junior personnel, with 
lower salaries, and the average pay for the DoN is lower. 
C. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
As part of a larger effort in the Naval Postgraduate School’s (NPS’s) part to look 
into implementing OSD’s recommendations, Chu’s (2012) thesis, titled Military 
Retirement Reform: An Expected Value Approach, calculated the NPV of the current 
system and the OSD options under a variety of discount rates, ranging from 0% to 15%. 
Chu’s (2012) thesis noted that as discount rates increased, so did the relative value of the 
OSD options with respect to the current system. Chu (2012) noted that the primary cause 
of this increased value is the weight that earlier payments (DC and CB) played in the 
calculation. By taking into account a 2.5% preference for earlier payments, we see that the 
values of the OSD alternatives are higher than the current system. However, this calculation 
only shows the value of military retirement to the individuals who reach retirement.  
Chu’s (2012) thesis used expected net present value (ENPV) to determine the value 
of this new system to the common Sailor. ENPV attempts to quantify the present value of 
a future amount when the recipient is not 100% certain that they will receive payment. 
Generally used by companies to plan for uncollected accounts, this calculation helps 
identify the value of these proposals to the average Sailor, one who is 86% likely to not 
receive full retirement benefits. Chu’s (2012) thesis calculated the ENPV by first 
calculating the probability of vesting under each component of the options. ENPV shows 
the benefit that any service member is likely to receive because of a change to the 
retirement policy. It is interesting to note that if we assume that a cohort of 10,000 people 
will enlist, with an average discount rate of 7.5%, statistically, 13.5% will receive full 
retirement. Table 5 compares these values.  
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(in thousands) Option A Option B Option C Option D Option D.1 
NPV $387.89 $350.10 $354.80 $335.37 $345.21 
Total $523,651.50 $472,635.00 $478,980.00 $452,749.50 $466,033.50 
ENPV $58.44 $52.83 $53.53 $51.74 $52.66 
Total $584,400.00 $528,300.00 $535,300.00 $517,400.00 $526,600.00 
Difference $60,748.50 $55,665.00 $56,320.00 $64,650.50 $60,566.50 
Table 5.    Total Value of OSD Proposals on a Cohort of 10,000 Recruits  
(After Chu, 2012) 
ENPV does a better job of capturing the benefit that these changes will have on the 
entire cohort, not just the 13.5% who reach retirement age. It is important to note that earlier 
payments, made to a greater population, return a significantly higher total value than when 
the population who receives full retirement is exclusively considered.  
ENVP demonstrates the importance of earlier payments when considering 
retirement benefits. Chu’s (2012) thesis noted that the impact of earlier payments on the 
ENPV calculation is greater for two reasons: first, the effect of the discount rates on later 
payments and personal preference for earlier payments; second, total attrition is lower early 
in a career, when these payments vest, and therefore, service members are more likely to 
receive earlier payments. Chu’s (2012) thesis recommended analyzing the effects of a DC 
retirement system similar to one recommended by the DBB for military retirement. 
D. 2011 DEFENSE BUSINESS BOARD BRIEF  
In a 2011 brief to the Secretary of Defense, the DBB recommended changing the 
purely DB retirement system to a purely DC retirement system (Spencer, 2011). Spencer 
recommended a contribution rate of 16% into a 401(k)-type account. This program would 
reduce retirement costs by 50%, provide retirement benefits to a larger portion of the 
military population, and divest the DoD from the future liability of pension plans.  
Spencer (2011) proposal suggested several incentives that would increase DC rates 
for some types of military service. These incentives included combat tours, family 
separation, and hardship tours. Spencer (2011) noted that the inherent benefits of this type 
of plan are payout options, partial withdrawals for education or home purchases, and full 
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transferability of benefits to survivors. Spencer (2011) justified a 16% contribution rate by 
stating that it is twice as much as the average DC provided in the private sector. 
E. SUMMARY 
In its retirement reforms, the OSD is ignoring retirement plans that place significant 
weight on DC. However, Grefer et al. (2012) concluded that retirement reform would lead 
to a higher proportion of junior personnel. Childs et al. (2012) suggested that employees 
and employers both prefer DC plans when the employees are middle- to junior-level 
personnel. And Chu’s (2012) thesis demonstrated that plans that offer a DC component 
provide a greater expectation for retirement benefits to junior personnel. Combined, this 
information argues that a DC retirement program can provide better compensation for those 
who detach before 20 years and is preferred by the demographics that make up our military 
force. This thesis calculates the value of a DC retirement plan and compare the result to 
the OSD proposals. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the methodology used in this 
analysis to calculate and compare the retirement benefits of the OSD proposals and DC 
retirement plan funded at identical levels. It explains the equations that are used to calculate 
DC and how these contributions are invested. It also describes how the model values the 
investment using the number of shares purchased instead of the amount of money invested. 
It further explains the benefit of “shares accounting” for calculating long-term investments. 
Finally, it describes how the OSD proposals are calculated for comparison. 
DC plans have characteristics that allow the funds to be used before retirement. 
Funds can be borrowed from the account for current purchases and paid back to avoid early 
withdrawal penalties. Funds can also be permanently withdrawn and incur tax penalties. 
DC plans can be transferred to other qualifying plans when employees change employment. 
They can also be transferred to survivors. The ability to withdraw funds before retirement, 
whether intended to be permanent or borrowed but never replaced, makes it possible for 
employees to deplete the funds in the account and unwittingly fall victim to their own poor 
financial planning. 
The characteristics of the OSD proposals provide certain restrictions that manage 
service members’ treatment of the retirement funds. The DC portion vests after five years, 
which is an incentive to complete the original commitment and provides funds that can be 
transferred to another qualifying retirement account. The CB is an incentive for middle- to 
senior-level managers to remain in service. The TP, DB1, and DB2 are incentives to 
complete 20 years and ensure that retirement benefits exist at retirement. 
The DC plan under analysis attempts to match the characteristics of the OSD 
options, offer similar incentives, and ensure that retirement funds are not depleted by the 
service member while employed by the DoD. The plan vests upon the honorable 
completion of the initial commitment. The average length of the first commitment is about 
six years for enlisted and about four years for officers (Defense Manpower Data Center, 
2013). The retirement account cannot be withdrawn during military service, but it can be 
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rolled over into a private 401(k) upon separation from the military or retirement. The 
contributions are 100% employer provided, begin when a member begins military service, 
are a percentage of base pay, and occur at the beginning of each month. Like other 
traditional 401(k) programs, contributions are pre-tax dollars and the growth is not taxed. 
In this model, the contributions are used to purchase shares of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
500 index at market value on the first trading day of the month. 
The following sections explain how we capture the values of the various inputs at 
time i and why this equation best represents the value of the account at time j, despite the 
variability of the contributions and the rate of growth of the investment.  
A. CONTRIBUTIONS 
Base pay changes throughout a 20-year career. Military pay is adjusted between 
1%–3% each year for inflation or to compete with civilian pay. Secondly, base pay 
increases as the YOS of the individual increases. These pay increases occur every other 
year. Thirdly, base pay increases as rank increases; an O4 is paid more than an O3.  
From the Sailor’s perspective, annual and biannual increases in pay occur 
automatically. However, rank advancement is dependent on a community’s career path and 
the typical time in rank for each career. This paper uses the typical civil engineer corps 
(CEC) officer 20-year career paths and the typical enlisted 20-year career paths for the 
cohorts under consideration. The typical CEC officer’s career followed the approximate 
time in rank during a 20-year career: two years in O-1, two years in O-2, six years in O-3, 
five years in O-4, and five years in O-6 (Civil Engineer Corps Detailer & Community 
Manager, 2012). The typical enlisted Sailor’s career followed the approximate time in rank: 
one year in E-1, one year in E-2, three years in E-3, four years in E-4, six years in E-5, 
three years in E-6, and one year in E-7 (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2013). These 
career paths can be found in Appendix A. 
This paper analyzes two careers—officer and enlisted—from eight cohorts, 1985 
to 1992. It is assumed that each career starts the first day of January and ends the last day 
of December 20 years later. The career paths are taken and correlated with the monthly 
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base pay for each career for each cohort. For example, the base pay for an officer from the 
1992 cohort during the officer’s 11th year is determined by considering the following: 
• Officer time in rank: two years in O-1, two years in O-2, six years in O-3, 
five years in O-4.  
• During the 11th year, the officer is an O4.  
• The 11th year occurs during 2002. 
• From the 2002 pay table, column “over 10,” row “O4” shows $4,696.20 to 
be the officer’s base pay (Defense Finance and Accounting Services, n.d). 
Determining pay in this manner results in a base pay (BPi) that takes into account the pay 
increases associated with inflation, time in service, and rank advancement. 
Base pay is then multiplied by the contribution rate (CR%) to calculate the dollar 
contributions for that month. The contribution rate is based upon the current programmed 
amount of 33.4% of base pay; from Table 5, we see it discounted by 15.5% for Option A, 
20.1% for Option B, 17.1% for Option C, 10.5% for Option D, and 13.4% for Option D.1, 
in accordance with Grefer et al.’s findings. The discounted percentages used, as a 
percentage of base pay, are 28.22%, 26.69%, 27.69%, 29.89%, and 28.92% for Options A, 




Monthly contribution where BPi is the base pay at time i and CR is the percentage 
from Table 5 
B. INVESTMENT VEHICLE 
The currency of this retirement fund is the sum of shares purchased throughout the 
duration of the career. The value of the fund is the product of the total number of shares 
purchased and the spot price of the shares on that date of valuation. 
There are many investment plans that provide investors the ability to customize 
their investment portfolios to suit their personal tolerance for risk. However, the average 
of these plans closely resembles the movement of the stock market, and the movement of 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = $𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅% 
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the S&P 500 reflects the movement of the market in general. As a result, the contributions 
are used to purchase shares based upon the value of the S&P 500 index.  
The price of the S&P 500 varied significantly from 1984 to 2012. Although the 
S&P 500 grew 752% from January 1985 to December 2013, there were significant gains 
and losses throughout that time period. The effects of these gains and losses are poorly 
represented if the average rate of return or the average annual rate of return is used. Table 
7 shows how using averages of a volatile stock price leads to errors in calculations.  
 













1 $100.00 $10.00 10.00 10.00 $100.00 $100.00 $- 
2 $100.00 $11.00 9.09 19.09 $200.00 $210.00 $10.00 
3 $100.00 $12.00 8.33 27.42 $300.00 $329.09 $29.09 
4 $100.00 $13.00 7.69 35.12 $400.00 $456.52 $56.52 
5 $100.00 $14.00 7.14 42.26 $500.00 $591.63 $91.63 
6 $100.00 $15.00 6.67 48.93 $600.00 $733.89 $133.89 
7 $100.00 $15.00 6.67 55.59 $700.00 $833.89 $133.89 
8 $100.00 $14.00 7.14 62.74 $800.00 $878.30 $78.30 
9 $100.00 $13.00 7.69 70.43 $900.00 $915.56 $15.56 
10 $100.00 $12.00 8.33 78.76 $1,000.00 $945.13 $(54.87) 
11 $100.00 $11.00 9.09 87.85 $1,100.00 $966.37 $(133.63) 
12 $100.00 $10.00 10.00 97.85 $1,200.00 $978.52 $(221.48) 
13 $100.00 $10.00 10.00 107.85 $1,300.00 $1,078.52 $(221.48) 
14 $100.00 $9.00 11.11 118.96 $1,400.00 $1,070.67 $(329.33) 
15 $100.00 $8.00 12.50 131.46 $1,500.00 $1,051.71 $(448.29) 
16 $100.00 $7.00 14.29 145.75 $1,600.00 $1,020.24 $(579.76) 
17 $100.00 $6.00 16.67 162.42 $1,700.00 $974.49 $(725.51) 
18 $100.00 $5.00 20.00 182.42 $1,800.00 $912.08 $(887.92) 
19 $100.00 $5.00 20.00 202.42 $1,900.00 $1,012.08 $(887.92) 
20 $100.00 $6.00 16.67 219.08 $2,000.00 $1,314.49 $(685.51) 
21 $100.00 $7.00 14.29 233.37 $2,100.00 $1,633.58 $(466.42) 
22 $100.00 $8.00 12.50 245.87 $2,200.00 $1,966.94 $(233.06) 
23 $100.00 $9.00 11.11 256.98 $2,300.00 $2,312.81 $12.81 
24 $100.00 $10.00 10.00 266.98 $2,400.00 $2,669.79 $269.79 
 Average $10.00   $2,400.00 $2,669.79 11.2% 
Table 6.   The Effects of Price Fluctuation on an Account With a Constant Rate of 
Investment 
(After Landry, 2012) 
During a 24-month period, the stock price started at $10/share and ended at 
$10/share, which would imply no growth. The average price was $10/share throughout the 
24-month period, which supports the assumption of no growth. One would expect the value 
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of an account with contributions of $100/month for 24 months in a stock that begins, ends, 
and has an average price of $10/share will have 240 shares with a total value of $2,400. 
However, because of price fluctuations, the account had almost 267 shares with an 
approximate final value of $2,670. 
This method of calculating the value of the retirement account better represents the 
true value of the accounts because it includes the effects that market fluctuation has on an 
investment. Market fluctuation mitigates the negative effects of market variability on a 
constant contribution. When the market price rises, fewer shares can be purchased with this 
contribution. When the price drops, a greater number of shares can be purchased by this 
contribution. As a result, fewer shares are purchased when the stock is relatively overpriced 
and more shares are purchased when the stock is at a discount. Calculating the growth of 
the retirement account thus, we gain a better approximation of the true value of the account. 
Equation 4 calculates the number of shares purchased each month at time i, and Equation 
5 calculates the value of the account at time j. 
(4) 
 
The number of shares purchased at time i, where BPi is the base pay at time i, CR is the 





The value of the account at time j, where BPi is the base pay at time i, CR is the 
contribution rate, Price/sharei is the spot price of the S&P 500 index at the time of 
contribution, Price/sharej is the spot price of the S&P 500 index at the time of valuation, 











� ∗ $𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅/𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗  
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C. CALCULATION OF OSD PROPOSALS 
To provide an accurate comparison, the OSD options use historical information and 
invests the contributions similar to the DC plan. The 5% DC, the CB, and the TP multipliers 
of each option, as shown in Table 2 and Table 3, are multiplied by the appropriate base pay 
for each career. The DC contributions, the CB, and the TP, when vested, will purchase 
shares of the S&P 500 index. The value of the DB1 and DB2 will be added at the end of 
the career but not invested. The NPV of the DB plans will be calculated by Equations 6 
and 7.  
 
  (6) 
 
Where A1 is the monthly payment of the annuity DB1, r is the interest rate of 5.75% used 
by the DoD (DoD Office of the Actuary [OA], 2012), and t1 is the duration, in months, 
that the annuity (A1) is paid  
(From Grefer et al., 2012) 
 
  (7) 
 
Where A2 is the monthly payment of the annuity DB2, r is the interest rate of 5.75% used 
by the DoD (DoD OA, 2012), t2 is the duration, in months, that the annuity (A2) is paid, 
and t1 is the duration in months between the calculation of the NPV and age 60  
(From Grefer et al., 2012) 
 
Equation 6 is used to calculate the NPV of retirement benefits under the current 
retirement system. The assumptions from the Grefer et al. are used; the average enlisted 
retirement occurs at age 40, the average officer retirement occurs at age 43, DB1 is paid 
until age 60, and the retiree is expected to live to the age of 79. 
D. CALCULATING THE VALUE OF THE COHORT 
Comparing the value of a DC plan to the entire cohort is accomplished by taking 
the shares in the individual account at the time of separation and multiplying them by the 
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number of people who separate. For example, if 100 Sailors from a cohort of 1,000 Sailors, 
or 10%, will detach during the second year of service, each Sailor was able to accrue 13 
shares during the first year but detached before he or she could purchase any shares in the 
second year. To account for the number of shares purchased by those who detach, the 
retention rate from the end of the second year is subtracted from the retention rate at the 
end of the first year. The difference is multiplied by the size of the cohort and the number 
of shares that each individual purchased during that first year. Equation 8 shows how we 




Where C is the original size of the cohort, R is the retention rate at time i, and v is the 
year when the account vests 
 
An additional challenge to this accounting is caused by vesting. An individual 
surrenders the account should they separate before their account vests. In this analysis, 
shares of such an account were sold at the spot price by the OSD and the funds retained for 
future use. This means that the detached shares did not begin to accumulate until after 
vesting occurs. 
After 20 years, we calculate the value of the retirement proposals to the cohort by 
multiplying the NPV of the retirement by the number of people who reach 20 years and 
adding it to the total value of the detached shares. Equation 9 shows how the total value to 




Where C is the original size of the cohort, R is the retention rate, and j is at 20 years 
 
The retention data for the cohort can be found in Appendix B (Defense Manpower Data 
Center, 2013). 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This thesis calculated how the Navy’s retirement contribution grew under the OSD 
proposals for the cohorts that entered the Navy from 1985 to 1992. Using the average career 
path for enlisted and CEC officers, this thesis determines the monthly DC for each option 
and purchased shares of the S&P 500 index on the first trading day of each month. These 
shares were recorded and tracked throughout the career. The NPV for each OSD option 
was calculated and added to the DC investment at the end of the 20-year career. To test for 
sensitivity, the NPV for each OSD option was calculated using discount rates equal to 
5.75% and 12.5% for the entire cohort, 7.0% and 10.0% for the officer cohort, and 8.7% 
and 12.5% for the enlisted cohort (Grefer et al., 2012). Finally, the CB and the TP were 
treated under two scenarios, titled “invest” or “spend,” with the results added to the NPV. 
This thesis also calculated what would have happened if the money used to fund 
the OSD options were instead used as a DC and given to the Sailors similar to a 401(k) or 
TSP. The government contributions of this scenario equal the amounts required to fund the 
OSD options, as determined by the Grefer et al. (2012). These contributions, calculated as 
a percentage of base pay, correlate to the proposals as follows: current DB at 33.4%, Option 
A at 28.22%, Option B at 26.69%, Option C at 27.69%, Option D at 29.89%, and Option 
D.1 at 28.92%. The contributions and purchased shares were calculated in the same manner 
as the OSD retirement proposals. At the end of the 20-year career, these DC accounts were 
valued and compared to the current retirement system and the associated OSD proposals. 
One challenge faced when calculating the total value of the DB plans is determining 
what, precisely, should be included in the comparison. The primary focus of the Grefer et 
al. was to determine the NPV for the retiree. However, the retiree is not the only beneficiary 
to these proposals. The inclusion of a DC component grants benefits to a larger portion of 
the cohort, as noted by Chu (2012). To gain a better understanding of the far-reaching 
effects of these plans, the value for both the retirees and the detached cohort was calculated. 
Another challenge faced when comparing the OSD plans to the DC plans stems 
from two subjective elements: the personal discount rate and a personal inclination to spend 
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or invest cash bonuses. The first problem was addressed by calculating the NPV using 
discount rates at rates equal to 5.75% and 12.5% for the entire cohort, 7.0% and 10.0% for 
the officer cohort, and 8.7% and 12.5% for the enlisted cohort. These rates were used or 
determined during Grefer et al.’s analysis of the OSD proposals. We address the second 
problem, the disposition of the bonuses, by analyzing the two extremes; 100% investment 
and 100% spend, called the “invest” and “spend” scenarios, respectively. In the invest 
scenario, the CB and TP are used to purchase stocks at the spot price at the time that the 
cash bonuses are received. In the spend scenario, the CB and TP are not invested and not 
added to the retirement benefit. 
A. OSD INVEST VS. SPEND SCENARIOS 
The values of the OSD proposals are highly sensitive to whether the cash bonuses 
are invested or spent. Investing the bonuses increases the value by a minimum of 10% in 
Option C and a maximum of 60% in Option B. The OSD proposals in the invest scenario 
create an illusion of better retirement value as a result of the treatment of the CB and the 
TP that generates overly idealistic results for two reasons. First, these cash bonuses were 
not taxed, which would have reduced these amounts by 25%–38%. Second, the after-tax 
total of the officer bonuses and the enlisted TP exceed the annual limits that restrict 
individual contributions to an employer-provided retirement plan. At best, the enlisted 
cohorts would have been able to contribute between $9,000 and $15,000 of their TP instead 
of the $30,000 to $151,000 calculated by applying Tables 2 and 3. The officer cohorts 
would have been restricted by the same $9,000 to $15,000 instead of contributing the 
$32,000 to $287,000 calculated. As a result of these practical and legal restrictions, the 
invest scenario is unachievable without changing tax laws and 401(k) personal contribution 
limits. Therefore, the spend scenario is the more practical scenario and is used in the 
comparisons of this thesis. The charts for the invest scenarios are included in Appendix C. 
B. RESULTS 
The thesis was able to show that retirement funds invested in a DC system grew 
larger than the same investments for the current DB system or the OSD’s proposed options. 
Figure 1 shows the total value of the retirement systems to the vested community under the 
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spend scenario at a discount rate of 5.75%. For Figures 1 and 2, the green bars show the 
growth of the retirement funds if invested in the DB retirement plan of the current and the 
OSD proposals (both are referred to as DB in the figures). The blue bars show the growth 
of the retirement funds if invested into the DC plan. The DC plan grew 134% larger than 
the value of the NPV of the current system and grew 101%, on average, greater than the 
value of the OSD proposals. 
 
Figure 1.  Total Value of Invested Retirement Funds Under the Spend Scenario at a 
Discount Rate of 5.75% 
The values of the OSD proposals are highly sensitive to the discount rate. Figure 2 
shows the total value of the retirement systems at a discount rate of 12.5% under the spend 
scenario. At a discount rate of 12.5%, the DC plan is 358% greater than the current plan 
and 195% greater, on average, than the OSD options in the spend scenario.  
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Figure 2.  Total Value of Invested Retirement Funds Under the Spend Scenario at a 
Discount Rate of 12.5% 
1. Benefit to the Retiree (20 Years of Service) 
The retirement funds of Figures 1 and 2 are composed of two beneficiaries: those 
who reach 20 YOS, called “retirees,” and those who vest but detach before 20 YOS. By 
isolating the retirees, we can identify the retirees’ portion of the DB plans and the DC plan. 
Taking the retirees’ information and laying it on top of the data for the vested cohort, we 
can first compare the total value of the DB proposals to the DC plan for the retiree and, 
second, we can see how much of the retirement benefit is received by those who detached 
before retirement. Figure 3 shows the retiree’s portion of the retirement proposals for the 
spend scenario at a discount rate of 5.75%. Like Figures 1 and 2, the blue bars show the 
value of the DC plan and the green bars show the value of the current DB and the OSD 
proposals in the spend scenario. The light green and the light blue areas show the portion 
received by the retirees. Figure 4 shows the same information at a discount rate of 12.5%.  
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Figure 3.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Spend Scenario at a Discount Rate of 5.75%  
As we can see, the current system allocates all retirement benefits to those who 
reach 20 YOS, and the OSD proposals allocate the super-majority of the retirement benefit 
to those who reach 20 YOS. Under the DC scenario, the retirees’ total value is 
approximately 10% less, on average, than the OSD proposals with a discount rate of 5.75% 
but 60% greater, on average, with a discount rate of 12.5%. This means that there is a 
discount rate for which the value of the 20 YOS retirement benefit of the DC scenario is 
equal, on average, to the OSD scenario. A quick regression analysis gives a discount rate 
of 6.39%, where the monetary value to the retiree is the same. 
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Figure 4.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Spend Scenario at a Discount Rate of 12.5% 
A discount rate of 6.39%, however, is outside the spectrum of discount rates that 
Grefer et al. determined was likely for enlisted (8.7%–12.5%) and officers (7.0%–10.0%). 
This suggests that both officers and enlisted may prefer a DC plan. For better granularity, 
the cohort is divided into the enlisted and officer components to compare their respective 
benefits at their respective discount rates.  
2. Enlisted Comparisons 
Figures 5 and 6 compare the value of the retirement systems after isolating the 
enlisted data, which uses the multipliers from Table 2. At a discount rate of 8.7%, Figure 
5 shows that the retirement benefit to the vested cohort under the DC system is 238% higher 
than the current retirement system and 148% higher, on average, than the OSD proposals. 




Figure 5.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Spend Scenario for Enlisted Members at a Discount Rate of 8.7% 
At a discount rate of 12.5%, Figure 6 shows that the retirement benefit to the vested 
cohort under the DC system is 372% higher than the current retirement system and 194% 
higher, on average, than the OSD proposals. It also shows that the retirement benefit for 20 
YOS is 55% greater, on average, than the OSD proposals. 
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Figure 6.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Spend Scenario for Enlisted Members at a Discount Rate of 12.5% 
3. Officer Comparisons 
Figures 7 and 8 compare the value of the retirement systems after isolating the 
officer data, which uses the multipliers from Table 3. At a discount rate of 7.0%, Figure 7 
shows that the retirement benefit to the vested cohort under the DC system is 153% higher 
than the current retirement system and 112% higher, on average, than the OSD proposals. 




Figure 7.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Spend Scenario for Officers at a Discount Rate of 7.0% 
At a discount rate of 10.0%, Figure 8 shows that the retirement benefit to the vested 
cohort under the DC system is 241% higher than the current retirement system and 156% 
higher, on average, than the OSD proposals. It also shows that the retirement benefit for 20 
YOS is 33% greater, on average, than the OSD proposals. 
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Figure 8.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Spend Scenario for Officers at a Discount Rate of 10.0% 
C. FINDINGS 
1. OSD Sensitivity 
Retirement funds grow larger when invested in this DC plan than if they are 
invested in the current DB or hybrid OSD options. The value of the DC plan to the retiree 
(someone with at least 20 YOS) is lower than the OSD options when the discount rate is 
low and becomes higher as the discount rate rises. The values of the DC plans are sensitive 
to the fluctuation in stock price. The NPVs of the DB for the current and the OSD plans 
are highly sensitive to the discount rate. In addition, the NPV of the OSD plans are sensitive 
to the treatment of the cash bonuses. 
The values of the OSD proposals are highly sensitive to whether the cash bonuses 
are invested or spent. The OSD proposals in the investing scenario create an illusion of 
better retirement value as a result of their treatment of the CB and the TP that generates 
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overly idealistic results for two reasons. First, these cash bonuses are not taxed, which 
would have reduced these amounts by 25%–38%. Second, the after-tax total of the officer 
bonuses and the enlisted TP exceed the annual contribution limits, restricting individual 
contributions to an employer-provided retirement plan. As a result of these practical and 
legal restrictions, the invest scenario is unachievable without changing tax laws and 401(k) 
personal contribution limits.  
2. DC Sensitivity 
The values of the DC plans are sensitive to the fluctuation in stock price when 
shares are purchased or sold. The data showed that earlier cohorts were able to purchase 
more shares during their career because the stock price was low, with respect to the monthly 
contributions. The price of stocks increased drastically in 1995 and diminished the 
purchasing power of the monthly contributions. This shift had a greater impact on the later 
cohorts who were junior enlisted and junior officers during this period. However, when the 
price of stocks dropped during 2008, these same individuals were able to enhance their 
holdings because their monthly contributions were much higher than before and the stock 
prices were much lower than before.  
The cohort most vulnerable to stock price retired in 2009. The price of stock began 
its precipitous rise after the 6th YOS, and it dropped right before retirement. In only three 
years, however, the stock price recovered. Therefore, the value of the account did not suffer 
permanent damage unless the shares were sold while the price was low. (See Appendix D.) 
The assumptions governing the DC plan for this thesis prohibited withdrawal of 
retirement funds before separating from the Navy and discouraged withdrawal of funds 
before retirement. These assumptions enable the Navy a measure of control to ensure that 
members separate with some benefits. In addition, retirees who reach 20 YOS are permitted 
to hold, transfer, or withdraw benefits without penalty. This provides retirees a degree of 
freedom that allows their account to continue to grow, tax free, until they choose to 
permanently retire. This account, whether withdrawn or allowed to grow, is also fully 
transferrable to survivors. 
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3. Vested Cohort 
Within the respective discount rates for the enlisted and officer population, 
investing in a DC system provides at least 2.5 times the benefit to the enlisted population 
and 2.1 times the benefit to the officer population. The ENPV for the enlisted cohort at the 
minimum discount rate of 8.7% is shown in Table 7, and the officer cohort at the minimum 
discount rate of 7.0% is shown in Table 8. 
 






















$20,471.26 $17,154.80 $24,597.43 $20,970.82 $22,784.12 
 241.1  155.3% 188.1% 108.5% 164.0% 135.1% 
Table 7.   Enlisted Expected Net Present Value  
Discount Rate 7.0%      


















$96,706.07 $78,734.79 $114,253.55 $94,802.31 $104,527.93 
 153.1% 115.1% 149.8% 78.6% 132.4% 103.9% 
Table 8.   Officer Expected Net Present Value 
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Under the assumptions for the DC plan and the assumptions of the OSD plan, 
enlisted Sailors’ ENPV under the DC plan is 150% higher, on average, than the OSD 
options. The officers’ ENPV under the DC plan is 116% higher, on average, than the OSD 
options. This follows Chu’s (2012) conclusions that DCs significantly raise the NPV that 
a Sailor can expect to receive. 
4. Retirees (20 Years of Service) 
The OSD proposals reduce the amount of the annuity paid to retirees, under the 
current system, in exchange for DC contributions and cash bonuses (Grefer et al., 2012). 
However, only a portion of the bonuses can be set aside for retirement as a result of tax 
laws and retirement contribution limits. The NPV of the funds that can be used for 
retirement is less than the NPV of the current retirement benefit. Essentially, the cash 
bonuses “buy” cooperation instead of providing a practical way to contribute to an 
individual’s retirement plan. In addition, there is a significant risk, greater than 75%, that 
Sailors will not vest, or receive, the CB, TP, DB1, and DB2. 
Where the OSD proposals use cash bonuses to incentivize retirees to accept a lower 
annuity, the DC proposal uses other attributes as incentives. The size of the DC account is 
proportional to the time in service. The accounts that vest before 20 YOS are much more 
valuable. In addition, the accounts are fully transferable to survivors and can be either 
rolled over into another employer’s 401(k) plan or left to continue to grow tax free. These 
incentives come with the opportunity to earn a higher return or risk a significant loss of 
value. 
5. Non-vested Retirement 
The DCs in this thesis did not vest until the honorable completion of the first 
commitment, which averages four years for officer populations and six years for enlisted 
populations. This resulted in approximately $211 million of retirement funds that were 
returned to the DoD. 
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6. Risks of Retirement Plans 
The risk associated with the DC plan is directly related to the price of the stock 
market. Fluctuations in price could cause prices to be high when stocks are purchased and 
low when members want to sell. This phenomenon was most evident with the 2009 retirees. 
However, the DC plan provides a foundation whereon the Navy can mitigate these risks. 
A diverse selection of TSP options allows for members to align the risks of their investment 
with their personal preference. Commands have financial advisors who can provide 
information to help members with their decisions. The laws governing TSP accounts 
provide a degree of control that enables the Navy to protect retirement accounts. 
The risk associated with the OSD plan is the likelihood of no vesting in the 
significant portions of the plan. Less than 17% of the enlisted Sailors and 23% of the 
officers are eligible to receive CB. Less than 12% of the enlisted Sailors and 18% of the 
officers are eligible to receive TP, DB1, and DB2. The DC portion of the OSD proposal is 
much smaller than the purely DC account, yet it is vulnerable to the same risks. 
D. DISCUSSION 
1. Effect on Recruiting 
This thesis does not analyze the effect that this system might have on recruiting. 
While it is likely that most recruits do not attribute military retirement as a significant factor 
in their decision to join, it does not mean that changes to the retirement program will not 
have an impact. If DCs are recognized as a form of compensation (Childs et al., 2012), 
changing from DB to DC, and noting it on the Leave and Earnings Statement (LES), 
informs the member of the compensation received. This compensation—whether base pay, 
basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for sustenance, incentive pay, or retirement 
contributions—may improve potential recruits’ impressions of military compensation, 
increase the number of potential recruits, and improve the quality of recruits. 
2. Effects on Retention 
This thesis does not analyze the effect that this system might have on retention or 
shaping the force. If DCs are recognized as compensation, members will be more acutely 
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aware of the total value of their service. When considering separating from service, military 
members will be better able to compare and contrast their current pay and benefits with 
potential offers from civilian employers. It could be that an easily transferable retirement 
reduces the incentive to stay for 20 years. It is also possible that a DC contribution four to 
five times the amount typically available from civilian employers would be an incentive to 
stay in the military. 
One way to manage this fluctuation is the judicious use of the non-vested retirement 
mentioned in Section C.5 of this thesis. During times of high attrition, these funds could 
be used to provide retention bonuses for critical skills. During times of low attrition, these 
funds could be used to provide separation bonuses to meet attrition goals. There are many 
ways that these funds could be used to shape the force without requiring additional 
appropriations. 
3. Effects on the Navy’s Budget 
This thesis does not analyze the residual effects that a DC retirement system might 
have on the Navy’s budget. The assumptions in the calculations are that each retirement 
system was operating at a steady state for several decades; therefore, the changes of the 
retirement systems and their effects on manning or budgets had already occurred. A direct 
effect on the budget comes from avoiding future liability. The complexities of budgeting 
for retirement under the current system become increasingly difficult to manage because 
of the increasing rise of base pay and the addition of COLA. Switching to a DC system can 
eliminate the future liability of the retirement system and significantly reduce the 
manpower required to manage and implement retirement benefits. In addition, using a DC 
retirement system could have an additional effect on the budget. This effect is found in the 
military members’ LES. 
The LES shows members their base pay, their allowances, and their incentive pay. 
The military member looks at the bottom line and sees, what they believe to be, their total 
compensation. However, this total does not display the medical benefits they receive nor 
the present value of the potential retirement benefits they might receive if they reach 20 
YOS. Under a DC system, the LES could be modified to include the amount of DC received 
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that month. Assuming that a DC system were approved and funded at 28.3%, the average 
cost of the OSD proposals, Table 9 shows how the entitlement section of the LES for an 
O4 stationed at NPS might look before and after such a change. The allotment sections of 
the LES would then show the DC as an allotment towards the service member’s TSP. 
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Current LES  LES with DC  
Base Pay 6852.90  Base Pay 6852.90 
BAS 242.60  BAS 242.60 
BAH 3072.00  BAH 3072.00 
   DC (28.3%) 1939.37 
Total 10167.50  Total 12,106.87 
Table 9.   Current LES Entitlements Contrasted With an LES That Includes Defined 
Contribution of 28.3% of Base Pay With the Entitlements 
As mentioned in Section D.1, recognizing DC as compensation could entice more 
recruits to join the military, increase competition for the available slots, and reduce the 
pressure to raise base pay. These benefits could also lead to increased retention mentioned 
in Section D.2, thereby reducing the pressure to raise base pay for the subsequent ranks.  
E. SUMMARY 
This thesis demonstrated that investing in a DC retirement system provides greater 
retirement benefits to military members than the current system or the OSD proposals, at 
identical funding levels. In addition, the DC system provides 2.5 times the retirement 
benefit to enlisted Sailors and 2.1 times the retirement benefit to officers who reach 20 
YOS given their respective discount rates. This method allows the Navy to reduce and 
eventually eliminate its future liability for retirement benefits and provides funds with 
which to manage force structure through retention or attrition bonuses. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
One way that the DoD is looking to reduce its budgets is by changing the current 
retirement system. The OSD proposed a system that reduces the DB for members who 
reach 20 YOS but also includes DCs, which vest earlier, and two cash bonuses to 
compensate for the lost value. CNA commissioned a study that determined that the OSD 
options could reduce the Navy’s retirement costs by 10%–20% but would also cause lower 
rates of retention that would require a higher number of recruits to ensure an adequate 
number of senior personnel. 
None of the proposals thoroughly examined the effects of a military retirement plan 
that is completely DC. The opportunities and risks associated with a DC plan are distinctly 
different than those offered by the military’s DB plans. This thesis calculated how the 
retirement contributions for each option would have grown for the 1985 to 1992 cohorts 
had they been in effect. This thesis also calculated how the retirement contributions would 
have grown under a DC system funded at identical levels. The average of each OSD 
scenario was compared to the corresponding average of the DC scenario and analyzed.  
A. MAIN FINDINGS 
Using historical data, this thesis showed that retirement contributions invested 
under the DC scenario provided twice the retirement benefit to the cohorts than the 
retirement contributions invested under the OSD proposals. In addition, the DC benefit 
received by retirees who reach 20 YOS was at least 13% higher, for officers, and 18% 
higher, for enlisted, than the OSD benefit under the applicable discount rates. The main 
findings of this research are as follows: 
• OSD options are highly sensitive to discount rates and the members’ ability 
to invest the cash bonuses. It is impractical to invest most of the cash 
bonuses. 
• The DC is highly sensitive to the price of stock; high prices can limit the 
number of shares purchased, and low prices can limit the final value at 
retirement. 
• The ENPV under the DC plan was 150% higher for enlisted and 116% 
higher for officers than the ENPV under the OSD options. 
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• Retirees see a slight increase in retirement benefit under the DC system. 
 The trade-off for retirees is between cash bonuses or portability, 
transferability to survivors, and greater earning potential.  
• Non-vested retirement funds returned approximately $211 million to the 
Navy. 
• Service members’ greatest risks under the systems are the following: 
 OSD plan: Less than 25% will vest in the CB, TP, and DB components 
of the system (approximately 90% of the value of the system). 
 DC plan: The member bears the risk of choosing the appropriate plan 
and the fluctuations of the market. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While this thesis demonstrates that a DC retirement plan, receiving equal funding 
as the OSD options, is a viable option for military retirement, it also leaves many questions 
unanswered. It suggested that if military members recognize DC contributions as 
compensation, that could have significant effects on recruiting, retention, and the Navy’s 
budget. Further research should be conducted to determine the impact of a DC retirement 
plan on the following items: 
• military recruiting, 
• retention or attrition of service members, 
• willingness of new recruits to accept DCs equal to 26% to 33.4% of base 
pay in lieu of DB retirement, 
• transition options and the willingness of existing service members to 
convert to a DC plan, 
• holistic effects on the Navy’s budget with regard to pay increases and 
administration requirements to operate and maintain a DC system, and 




APPENDIX A: CAREER PATHS 
 
Figure 9.  Career Path for Active Duty Civil Engineer Corps Officer 
 
Table 10.   Career Path for Active Duty Enlisted 
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APPENDIX B: RETENTION DATA 
 
Table 11.   Officer Retention for Cohorts From 1985–1992 
 
Table 12.   Enlisted Retention for Cohorts From 1985–1992 
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APPENDIX C: INVEST SCENARIO CHARTS 
 
Figure 10.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Invest Scenario at a Discount Rate of 5.75% 
 
Figure 11.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Invest Scenario at a Discount Rate of 12.5% 
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Figure 12.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Invest Scenario for Enlisted Members at a Discount Rate of 8.7% 
 
Figure 13.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Invest Scenario for Enlisted Members at a Discount Rate of 12.5% 
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Figure 14.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Invest Scenario for Officers at a Discount Rate of 7.0% 
 
Figure 15.  Total Value of the Retired Portion of the Invested Retirement Funds Under the 
Invest Scenario for Officers at a Discount Rate of 10.0% 
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APPENDIX D: 2009 RETIREMENT DATA 
The charts in this appendix show the growth of a single account throughout a  
20-year officer career. At the end of each year (x-axis), the account is represented as a bar. 
The height of the bar represents the value of the account found on the y-axis. Figures 16 to 
21 represents data from the spend scenario of this analysis. The charts show that the value 
of the defined contribution (DC) account (in red) drops below the value of the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) option at retirement. This drop in value is a result of the 
drastic drop in the price of  the S&P 500 index shares. However, if the funds are not 
withdrawn from the DC account, the value of the account rises above the value of the OSD 
option. 
The two accounts are treated within the bounds allowed by their respective plans. 
The DC plan can be withdrawn, transferred, or left alone. The OSD plan requires that the 
DC component be left alone and the DB component provide a monthly annuity. The 
annuity changes the spot value of the DB component as time elapses. The reduction in 
value is accomplished by calculating the net present value (NPV) of the defined benefit 
(DB) components using months instead of years and recalculating the NPV of the DB 
components for each month. An incongruity exists in the comparison because the value of 
the OSD annuity payment is removed from the comparison each month, making the value 
of the DP component of the OSD account smaller while the DC account is not paying an 
annuity. 
However, this incongruity exemplifies the comparison between these two 
retirement options. The OSD plan provides the 20-YOS retiree with a more stable source 
of income and provides some diversification between DC and DB. However, the risk of 
the OSD plan is that less than 12% of enlisted and 18% of officers will receive these 
benefits. The DC plan provides the 20-YOS retiree with greater flexibility regarding 
withdrawal and the ability to transfer and greater opportunity for growth. However, the risk 
of the DC plan is borne by the retiree and is highly sensitive to stock price. The opportunity 
for growth with the DC plan is a trade-off for the annuity payment of the OSD option. 
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Figure 16.  Comparing the Growth of OSD A to DC for 2009 Retirees 
 
Figure 17.  Comparing the Growth of OSD B to DC for 2009 Retirees 
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Figure 18.  Comparing the Growth of OSD C to DC for 2009 Retirees 
 
 
Figure 19.  Comparing the Growth of OSD D to DC for 2009 Retirees 
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Figure 20.  Comparing the Growth of OSD D.1 to DC for 2009 Retirees 
  
Figure 21.  Comparing the Growth of OSD Options to DC funded at 33.4% for 2009 Retirees 
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